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Key Points
t International linkage of regional, national, and subnational climate poli-
cies could play an important role in supporting the ramp up of ambition 
in Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) over time — including, 
over the longer term, in East Asia — and so contribute to the success of the 
Paris Agreement.
t Linkage has the potential to lower overall costs of mitigation, given the 
wide range of marginal abatement costs across countries, and also can lower 
administrative costs of compliance and help build political momentum, 
both of which can contribute to scaling up ambition.
t he bottom-up nature of the Paris Agreement has led to great heterogene-
ity of NDCs, which can pose challenges for linking. hese challenges are 
not insurmountable, but will require thoughtful guidance for the efective 
operation of key provisions for linking in Article 6 of the Paris Agreement.
t Article 6 guidance can facilitate linkage by, among other things, provid-
ing clear deinitions and principles for internationally transferred mitiga-
tion outcomes (ITMOs), taking into account the heterogeneous nature 
of NDCs, while avoiding restrictive criteria that could impede efective 
linkage.
Introduction
he Paris Agreement features a hybrid policy architecture, combining top-down elements 
for monitoring, reporting, and veriication, and bottom-up elements, including NDCs.1 he 
Agreement has achieved a key necessary condition for ultimate success, namely adequate 
scope of participation, with participating nations accounting for virtually 100% of global 
GHG emissions.
1 he arguments in this brief are developed more fully in Mehling, et al. (2017). Citations to the relevant literature are provided there.
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he other key necessary condition for ultimate success of this new approach is adequate, 
collective ambition of the individual NDCs — to put the world on a path toward achieving 
the global political target of limiting temperature increases to 2° C. A central question is how 
to provide a structure and/or incentives that will facilitate such increases in ambition over 
time. International linkage of regional, national, and sub-national policies can be part of the 
answer.
A challenge — including in East Asia — is the substantial degree of heterogeneity that char-
acterizes climate policies along three dimensions: types of policy instruments, levels of politi-
cal jurisdictions implementing those policies, and types of targets. Our research examines 
such heterogeneity and identiies: (a) which linkages are feasible; (b) of these, which are most 
promising; and (c) what accounting mechanisms would make their operation consistent with 
the Paris Agreement.
Why focus on linkage?
he main economic argument for linkage is cost efectiveness — the ability to achieve a given 
level of emission reductions at lowest cost. Since a major impediment to ambitious climate 
policy is concern about the cost of mitigation, any policy that can lower costs can also lower 
political resistance to ambitious policy. It has been estimated that international linkage could 
reduce the cost of achieving the emissions reductions speciied in the initial set of NDCs 
under the Paris Agreement by 32% by 2030 and by 54% by 2050 (World Bank 2016, 83, 86).
Linkage can be valuable even when the linking jurisdictions have similar carbon prices. Here, 
the beneits are political and administrative rather than economic. he political beneits from 
linking policies may stem from providing a sense of momentum to which political supporters 
of climate policy can point and so build support. Since GHG emissions are a global pollut-
ant, no politician wants to appear to be acting unilaterally to control emissions. Linking with 
other jurisdictions is a tangible signal of a multilateral approach to the problem. here are 
also administrative economies of scale through linkage. Jurisdictions can share best practices 
in designing and operating emission-control policies and so learn from each other. hey can 
also share administrative and oversight costs and avoid costly duplication of control eforts.
Linkage and heterogeneous systems
he bottom-up nature of the Paris Agreement has led to great heterogeneity in the submitted 
NDCs. We separate these heterogeneous attributes into three categories: policy instrument, 
political jurisdiction, and target. We divide our consideration of political jurisdiction into 
two types of heterogeneity: level of government engaged in the prospective linkage (regional, 
national, or sub-national) and status under the Paris Agreement (Party or non-Party). Finally 
we focus on two types of target heterogeneity: the type of policy-instrument target and the 
type of NDC target. Our research suggests that heterogeneity per se is not an impediment to 
HARVARD PROJECT ON CLIMATE AGREEMENTS » 51
linkage. But there is a role for guidance on the key provision in the Paris Agreement for link-
ing — Article 6.2.
Priorities for effective Article 6 guidance
Parties are currently working to elaborate guidance on Article 6.2, but have expressed widely 
difering views on what issues to include in such guidance. During the discussions at COP-23 
in Bonn, Parties signaled agreement on the need to ofer at least minimal guidance on how to 
account for transfers of ITMOs, yet diverged on a number of speciic issues.
Elements that will most surely see inclusion in guidance on Article 6.2 are deinitions, prin-
ciples, and accounting rules to prevent double-counting of emission reductions. Beyond 
that, Parties are likely to adopt some clariication on how to quantify mitigation targets and 
outcomes from diferent types of climate actions (whether through carbon taxes, cap-and-
trade instruments, performance standards, or other policy instruments); and how to accom-
modate heterogeneity of target types, difering base years among linking parties, and difer-
ences in degree of geographic coverage of NDCs.
Guidance on Article 6.2 could also address the nature and scope of ITMOs. One issue is the 
metric for ITMOs: Will there be a single common metric, presumably tons of CO
2
 equiva-
lent, or will there be multiple metrics, such as installed capacity of renewable power? his 
relates to a broader question of whether ITMOs will be, in efect, a single or multiple type of 
compliance unit.
Some parties support addressing additional topics in the guidance, such as environmental 
integrity and sustainable development; institutional elements, such as centralized registry 
tracking of the transfer and use of ITMOs; and eligibility and accounting of transfers to or 
from non-Parties (or sub-national jurisdictions therein). Importantly, however, it is far from 
certain that inclusion of these issues will garner the necessary consensus among Parties nor is 
it clear that some of the topics under discussion would contribute to cost-efective emission 
mitigation.
As they negotiate the work program on implementation of the Paris Agreement, Parties have 
an opportunity to establish clear and consistent guidance for operationalizing Article 6. If 
they can set aside political diferences and agree on a robust framework for ITMO transfers, 
they will not only avoid impeding future linkage of climate policies across jurisdictions, but 
could create an enabling context with common deinitions and modalities. Such a harmonized 
set of parameters could help accelerate linkage and allow for broader and deeper cooperation.
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It could also enhance Parties’ — including those in East Asia — ability to scale up the ambi-
tion of their NDCs and potentially foster constructive engagement between Parties and non-
Parties, as well as sub-national jurisdictions. But if guidance extends much beyond basic 
accounting rules, restrictive requirements could impede efective linkage. True to the spirit 
of the Paris Agreement, less can be more. A combination of common accounting rules and 
absence of restrictive criteria and conditions might therefore be the best outcome for broader 
and deeper climate policy cooperation.
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